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EDITORIAL
SARS: market, toilet, hospital, and laboratory
One year after the worldwide outbreak of the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), inadequacies in our know-
ledge of this new disease, as well as in our compliance to
measures for controlling the spread of the disease, still give
us much cause to continue learning about issues of public
health, infection control, and laboratory safety.
Neglect is widespread
The origin of the SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) has not
been pinpointed with certainty. Yet, there is circumstantial
evidence that SARS is likely a zoonosis, and that the virus
originated in wild mammals and crossed the species barrier
to humans. The link between wild animals and humans might
involve game animals that were kept and traded in wet mar-
kets in southern China. Surveillance of game animals in these
markets showed that the civet cat (Paguma larvata) could be
an important link.1 Seroprevalence of antibodies to SARS-
CoV is higher among traders of these game animals in
Guangdong province than among control populations, includ-
ing non–wild animal traders in the same markets and hospi-
talised patients suffering from non-respiratory diseases.1
Further evidence suggesting a link between SARS and game
animals came from four community-acquired cases of SARS
in Guangdong province in January 2004, some of which had
a definite history of contact with these animals.2 Once the
virus has infected a human, further mutations may confer it
the ability to be transmitted from person-to-person with a
high degree of efficiency.3
Severe acute respiratory syndrome is merely one of the
examples of a zoonotic infection with epidemic or pandemic
potential to have crossed the species barrier.  Human immuno-
deficiency virus infection and avian influenza are two of the
well-known examples in recent times. Predicting which, when,
and where such zoonotic transmissions will occur is
impossible, but certain principles might be helpful in reduc-
ing the risk of such an event. Firstly, and most importantly, is
to minimise and avoid unnecessary contact between humans
and wild animals. This precaution is virtually the only way to
reduce the risk of transmission for previously unknown patho-
gens such as SARS-CoV. The preservation of the natural
environment and habitats of wild animals is the ultimate
target, and is not only crucial for conservation, but also for
the prevention of incursion of humans into the natural eco-
system of infectious agents and the prevention of incursion
of animals or vectors carrying pathogens into our im-
mediate environment. Outbreaks of leptospirosis, borreliosis,
rickettsiosis, and hantavirus infections are some examples of
such interactions between human beings and the natural
environment. The prevention of infectious diseases should
be considered when one is planning new environmental
projects. Yet, this aspect is most often neglected.4
Secondly, although the consumption of wild and some-
times endangered species of animals has no documented nu-
tritional benefits to human health, it has been a cultural prac-
tice for thousands of years. In addition to detrimental effects
on biodiversity, this practice provides a potential portal for
the acquisition of exotic zoonoses. Such habits obviously
cannot change overnight, but attempts were at least made to
ban the consumption of game animals in southern China at
the height of the SARS epidemic last year. Unfortunately,
such a control measure was not insisted on, perhaps for
political, economic, or cultural reasons. The ban was then
lifted after only a few months. As a consequence, several cases
of community-acquired SARS were reported in January 2004
in Guangdong province, in which individuals apparently con-
tracted the infection after having contact with these animals—
for example, in restaurants. Undesirable practice in culinary
habits is a definite risk factor for some zoonoses, and de-
serves more attention than it is currently receiving.
Thirdly, the wet market has emerged as an important
incubator of zoonotic infections that can be transmitted to
humans via animals used as food. Prime examples are highly
pathogenic avian influenza viruses—most notably, influenza
A H5N1 viruses.5 The importance of the wet market in
allowing pathogenic viruses to circulate, multiply, and
undergo genetic reassortment and mutation has been con-
firmed in Hong Kong since 1997. The implementation of a
number of measures such as the introduction of rest days in
markets have had a significant impact on the dynamics of
the viruses in terms of reduction of the viral load in live
poultry kept in the wet markets. This in turn may reduce the
risk of transmission to humans. Whether the same dynam-
ics apply to SARS-CoV is unknown, but the potential of the
wet market in SARS-CoV transmission should never be
ignored. Appropriate management of wet markets in which
live animals are traded must be strictly observed—not only
to prevent SARS and avian influenza, but also other, so
far unknown infections.
Another setting that could act as an epicentre for the
transmission of infectious agents is the hospital: when a
patient with SARS or avian influenza is sick enough to be
hospitalised, these infections can be spread readily to health
professionals and other patients. Several nosocomial
pathogens, most notably methicillin-resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus (MRSA) in Hong Kong, have already become
endemic in our hospitals. Eradication of such endemic patho-
gens from the hospital is extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible. Unlike MRSA, SARS-CoV is unlikely to become en-
demic in the hospital setting, but the nosocomial outbreak
of SARS in many hospitals in 2003 was a painful reminder
that rapid and extensive transmission could occur if there was
just a small breach in hospital infection control measures.
One year after the SARS outbreak, we are proud to declare
that attitudes, policies, and practices regarding infection
control have been improved in our hospitals. Hospitals in
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mainland China have also made similar claims. In the
latest outbreak of SARS in Beijing in May 2004, however,
there was epidemiological evidence that nosocomial trans-
mission of SARS had occurred.6 Had hospital infection
control practices been strictly adhered to, such cases should
not have arisen. Therefore, even at times when a communi-
cable disease is no longer endemic in the community, hos-
pital infection control must not be forgotten or relaxed.
There have been four clusters of cases (each ranging from
one to nine patients) since the end of the SARS pandemic in
June 2003. With the exception of the four community-
acquired cases in January 2004 in Guangdong, all of the three
other clusters had originated (or were likely to have originated)
from laboratories. These cases were in countries and areas
with a fairly high level of sophistication in terms of biomedi-
cal research; in some instances, state level laboratories were
involved. In the very early stages of the outbreak in 2003, the
WHO had already issued guidelines on laboratory biosafety
issues. Compliance to official guidelines, however, has
always been difficult to ensure. The index case of the recent
outbreak in Beijing in April 2004 is a timely reminder to all
SARS researchers that a small breach in laboratory biosafety
is all that is required to start another outbreak of SARS in the
community. Laboratory staff must remain vigilant at all times.
Foresight or overkill?
The route of transmission of SARS and the level of
personal protection required in the hospital have been
the topic of debate for some time. In its consensus on the
epidemiology of SARS, the WHO concluded that “the
primary mode of transmission appears to be direct mucous
membrane (eyes, nose, and mouth) contact with infectious
respiratory droplets and/or through exposure to fomites.”7
Epidemiological studies performed during nosocomial
outbreaks of SARS have also suggested that droplet
transmission is the most important mode of transmission,
and that the adoption of simple infection control measures
such as the wearing of surgical masks and proper hand-
washing are sufficient to prevent infection. Airborne trans-
mission has repeatedly been negated.
Yet, there had been an outcry for the lack of personal pro-
tective equipment for health care workers in Hong Kong, at
least in the early part of an outbreak. For their own protection,
health care workers have often resorted to the use of N95 (or
even N100) respirators, respirators with high-efficiency par-
ticulate air (HEPA) filters, and even powered air-purifying
particulate respirators. Indeed, hospital infection control
guidelines from the United States Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention and the WHO also recommended the use
of respirators for respiratory protection. Another area intensely
debated was the ventilation system of hospitals. Consider-
able resources were invested into renovating existing venti-
lation systems, installing HEPA filters, and constructing
negative-pressure isolation rooms. Although these engineer-
ing improvements are without doubt essential in a properly
equipped hospital with isolation facilities, one cannot help
but to ask whether they are essential specifically for SARS
prevention. If SARS were indeed an infection transmitted by
relatively large respiratory droplets rather than droplet nuclei
(ie airborne transmission), then why should we ask for respi-
ratory and negative pressure rooms, which are convention-
ally used only for airborne infections such as tuberculosis and
measles? Does more personal protective equipment neces-
sarily mean more protection? Are these measures an overkill?
If we believe SARS is purely a respiratory infection
that is transmitted by large respiratory droplets, then all
these protective measures against airborne transmission
are definitely an overkill. However, a recent study jointly
performed by researchers from two universities in Hong
Kong showed that airborne transmission of SARS can
indeed occur, at least in the setting of a community housing
complex.8 This mode of spread is hardly surprising, because
SARS-CoV is shed in the secretions of symptomatic pa-
tients at fairly high quantities and the virus is much more
resistant to adverse environmental conditions (such as desic-
cation) than were previously known human coronaviruses.9,10
Both these properties enable the virus to survive in droplet
nuclei in sufficient quantities and for sufficient time to be
spread in the air. The control of SARS within hospitals, there-
fore, may at times need measures more than just the preven-
tion of droplet formation, especially when there is significant
aerosolisation from infected patients, such as during
bronchoscopy, intubation, and suctioning of the airways.
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